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VICTORIA UN1\/ERS1TY ()!=' WELLINGTON 
I INTRODUCTION 
The 1993 general election in New Zealand was a landmark occasion. 
Not only was it a tightly contested electoral race that saw the National Party 
returned to power with a majority of just one vote, it also saw New Zealanders 
vote to introduce an entirely new voting system for future elections - the old 
'First-Past-the-Post' (FPP) system would be replaced by a Mixed Member 
Proportional system (MMP). 
The reasons for this outcome can be simply stated. A Royal 
Commission inquiry conducted 7 years earlier had recommended that New 
Zealand consider a new voting system, with MMP being its prefe1Ted option. 1 
FPP had long been seen to disadvantage parties other than National and Labour, 
however the outcome of both the 1978 and 1981 elections, where Labour lost to 
National despite winning more votes nationwide, had increased sentiments of 
discontent with the existing system. Change was in the air for the electoral 
system; it remained to be seen how this would impact on the New Zealand 
political scene. 
Almost twelve years later, as New Zealand approaches its fourth election 
under MMP, it seems timely to assess the implications that this new system has 
had on the New Zealand constitution. This paper presupposes that the advent of 
a new voting system in New Zealand has indeed changed our constitution - and 
yet the fonnal constitutional stmcture appears largely unaltered. There were, for 
example, no amendments made to the Constitution Act 1986 to recognise the 
new voting system. The constitution of New Zealand is a political one - in the 
absence of a single legal document outlining the rules of the constitution, and a 
judiciary with the power to enforce them, the operation of New Zealand's 
constitution is largely determined by political actors. As one political 
commentator puts it; "A constih1tion is a political matter in its substance and a 
1 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJHR 
H3. 
2 
legal matter only in its form."
2 For trus reason, a change in voting system, and 
hence in the way that our political leaders are chosen, cannot but have an impact 
on the constitutional framework of New Zealand, in practice if not on paper. 
Part II of this paper looks briefly at the characteristics of the constitution, and 
outlines the particular characteristics that dominated prior to the 1993 
referendum in which New Zealanders voted for a new electoral system. Part III 
then describes the Mixed Member Proportional system that was introduced. 
Pa1i IV goes on to consider the constitutional implications of the new system for 
the legislative branch of Government, while Part V addresses the impact on the 
executive branch. Throughout, the changes in the relationship between the two 
will be explored. As one of the primary criticisms of FPP was that it allowed 
too much power to be concentrated in the executive branch, the paper focuses on 
the ways in which MMP has acted as a check on the executive, through an 
increase in scrutiny by the legislature, and in the changing nature of Cabinet.
3 
As constitution-making does indeed take place at the interface between politics 
and law, 4 a change in the way in which political actors are chosen and 
legitimised must be acknowledged as affecting the constitution. This is 
especially true when the change has such an impact on the balance of power 
between political and Governmental institutions. Finally, Part VI looks at what 
MMP means for New Zealand as a Parliamentary democracy. 
This paper postulates that MMP does have the potential to have a 
considerable impact on the way in which the New Zealand Constitution operates 
on a day-to-day level. The extent of the shift in power during each 
parliamentary term depends on the outcome of each election. In particular, the 
amount of support enjoyed by the governing party or parties in the House of 
Representatives will dictate the extent to which the executive can dominate the 
legislative programme. Where an election results in a minority Government that 
relies on other parties for support, the need for negotiation and compromise 
within the House will strengthen the power of the legislative branch. Where a 
2 Colin James "The Political History and Framework" (Building the Constitution Conference, 
Wellington, 7-8 April 2000) . 
3 For further reading in this area see Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "To what extent has MMP 
reduced the powers of the executive in New Zealand" (Paper Presentation to the 5
th Public Law 
Forum, Wellington 24-25 March 2003). 
4 B V Harris "The Constitutional Future of New Zealand" (2004) NZLR 269, 273. 
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coalition results, intra-executive politics will play a larger role in determining 
the manner in which Government policies are decided upon, pursued and 
implemented. Where this coalition is also a minority, the need for power 
sharing and negotiation will be still greater. The rhetoric of MMP claims that it 
places more power in the hands of New Zealand voters. In reality, it gives more 
power to an increased number of political actors, but political pressures will 
oblige these actors to have an increased regard to the wishes of the voting public. 
II THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION 
A The Legal Framework 
New Zealand is often considered unusual in that it has no one written 
constitutional document that can be called 'The Constitution'. 
5 This is not to 
say that New Zealand does not have a constitution, or that no parts of it are 
written down. Rather the New Zealand constitution is a peculiar amalgam of 
written and unwritten principles, emanating from a wide array of sources. 
The formal Constitutional framework is set out in the Constitution Act 
1986. This allows for three branches of Government: Parliament ( consisting of 
the Sovereign and the House of Representatives), an Executive Council, and a 
judiciary. However the Constitution Act makes no mention of some 
fundamental institutions of Government, such as Cabinet, and overstates the 
actual real powers of other actors, such as the Governor-General. It does not 
definitively cover all aspects of the New Zealand constitution. Further, the 
Constitution Act is merely descriptive of some of New Zealand's constitutional 
structures and principles, rather than being their source. 
6 
Constitutional principles are also found in the common law, in other 
important statutes (for example the Ombudsman Act 1975, the Public Finance 
5 Only the United Kingdom and Israel are in a similar position. 
6 Philip Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James Building 
the Constitutio11 (Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 
2000) 168, 170. 
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Act 1989, and the Bill of Rights Act 1990), in court decisions and, importantly, 
in non-justiciable constitutional conventions. 7 
B Co11stitutio11al Conventions 
Constitutional conventions play a crucial role in the operation of the 
constitution. Conventions are non-legal rules of a political or constitutional 
nature, 8 accepted norms which regulate constitutional behaviour. They are non-
justiciable, and are binding on political actors to the extent to which they 
(collectively) feel themselves to be bound. Conventions flesh out the legal 
skeleton created by legislation and fundamental constitutional principles, to fill 
the gaps, as it were, and to ensure that the principles may be applied in practice. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognised the importance of conventions in 
coining the equation: "constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal 
the total constitution of the country."
9 
There is however no definitive way to define what is or is not a 
constitutional convention, as they are constantly evolving to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Breach of a constitutional convention will be met with political, 
rather than legal, consequences. If there are no ramifications for what should be 
a breach of a convention, perhaps that convention will come to be regarded as 
unnecessary and will wither away, while new conventions will rise up to take its 
place in meeting the new demands of the political scene. While the flexible 
nature of our Constitution means that most changes may be made by an ordinary 
statute of Parliament, still more changes may evolve gradually at the level of 
constitutional conventions. The advent of MMP has necessitated the evolution 
of several key constitutional conventions, several of which will be considered 
below. 
7 For fi.irther reading see Philip Joseph Constitutio11a/ a11d Admi11istrative law in New Zealand 
(2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) Chap 5 "The 'Unwritten Constitution"'; Palmer and Palmer 
Bridled Power: New Zealand's Constitution a11d Government ( 4ed, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2004) 4-6. 
8 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb The New Zealand Legal System: Structures, Processes 
a11d Legal t/ieo,y (3ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 140. 
9 Refere11ce re Questions Concerni11g Amendment of Co11stitution of Canada [1981] 1 SCR 753, 
para 263. 
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C Constitutional Characteristics under FPP V 
The electoral system, in determining many of the actors who inhabit our 
constitutional scene, also plays a fundamental constitutional role. The 
significance of the voting system may be evidenced by the fact that the 
provisions of the Electoral Act 1993 which relate to the method of voting are 
among the few provisions on the New Zealand statute books to be in any way 
entrenched, requiring a majority of 75 per cent in the House of Representatives, 
or the support of a majority of votes cast in a general referendum. '
0 Prior to the 
passing of this Act, New Zealand's electoral system was governed by the 
Electoral Act 1956, and consisted of a first-past-the-post system, whereby the 
voters in each constituency elected a candidate, and the party with the most 
candidates nationwide formed a Government. The three major characteristics of 
an FPP system of voting are: 
1) two-party dominance; 
2) disproportionate representation in Parliament; 
3) single-party, majority Government. 
1 Two-party dominance 
FPP systems of voting promulgate two-party political environments. 
11 
Candidates are elected at a constituency level, but it is the party with the most 
elected candidates which will be able to forn1 a Government. In New Zealand, 
the National and Labour parties were the dominant players. Minor parties did 
not offer a realistic choice for voters, as they were never going to win enough 
seats to govern. If voters were unhappy with the status quo come election time, 
they may have seen their best option as being to vote for the candidate from the 
major Opposition party, as the only party likely to be able to win enough 
electoral seats nationwide to oust the current Government. A pragmatic 
10 Electoral Act 1993, s 268, entrenching s 168. 
11 A Lijphart Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Pe,formance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999) 165, cited in Peter Aimer "The Changing 
Party System" in Raymond Miller (Ed) New Zealand Government and Politics (2ed, Oxford, 
Auckland, 2001) 271,271. 
approach was necessary, even if voters might have preferred another candidate 
to be their representative in Parliament. 
2 Disproportionate representation 
Because the make-up of Parliament was determined by the outcome of 
regional constituency votes, the nwnber of seats that a party was allocated in the 
House was seldom proportionate to the percentage of the popular vote that party 
(or rather, their candidates) actually received. This was exacerbated by the 
tendency for constituency seats to be won by candidates from one of the two 
main parties. National and Labour were invariably over-represented in 
Parliament, while smaller parties were under-represented. The results of the 
1981 election provide a clear example - the National and Labour parties 
between them received only 77.8 per cent of the popular vote but won 97 out of 
the 99 constituency seats; while the Social Credit Party received 20. 7 per cent of 
the votes, yet won only 2 seats in the House (2.2 per cent of the House). Under 
---FPP, candidates from smaller parties rarely had a real chance of winning a 
constituency seat. A vote cast for one of these minor candidates was often seen 
to be 'wasted', perpetuating the entrenched dominance of two major political 
paiiies on the country's political scene. However, the system could also act to 
the detriment of the dominant parties - in both the 1987 and the 1981 elections, 
more votes were cast nationwide for candidates from the Labour party, yet the 
National party won more seats, and the right to govern. 
3 Single party, majority Government 
Under FPP, it was almost guaranteed that one party would wm a 
majority of seats in Parliament, and thus be able to form a strong majority 
Government. The senior members of the largest party represented in the 
legislative branch would fonn a committee of Ministers to carry out the 
executive functions of Government - the Cabinet. When Bagehot described the 
secret of efficiency under the Westminster system as being its "fusion" of 
7 
legislative and executive, 12 he was referring to a Cabinet ansmg out of a 
plurality system of voting such as FPP.
13 As Cabinet dominated the governing 
party's Caucus, and Caucus dominated the House, Cabinet was virtually assured 
of being able to pass legislation implementing any policy it liked.
14 However, as 
the governing pa1iy rarely represented a majority of voters, and as the plurality 
system was seen to disregard the interests of minorities and to disadvantage 
smaller political paiiies, voices began to call for a change in electoral system, 
finally resulting in the adoption ofMMP in 1993, to come into effect at the 1996 
election. 
III MMP: THE NEW WAY 
A The MMP Process 
On 6 November 1993, New Zealand voters at the general election were 
given the opportunity to vote in a referendum to decided electoral system to be 
used in future elections. The results were clearly in favour of a new Mixed 
Member Proportional system of voting, or MMP.
15 Thus, the 1993 election was 
the last election to be held under the pluralist, 'first-past-the-post', system. The 
new MMP electoral system became the only constitutional foundation of the 
New Zealand system of Government to have ever been formally mandated by 
the people. 16 
Under MMP, each voter receives two votes - one is for a candidate from 
their electorate, while the other is for the party of their choice. In each 
electorate, the candidate who receives the most votes is elected to the House of 
Representatives, as under the former FPP system. However it is the party, or list, 
12 Walter Bagehot The English Constitution (Fontana, London, 1963) 65 . 
i:; Matthew Palmer Constitutional Design and law: The Political Economy of Cabinet and 
Congressional Covemment (JSD Dissertation, Yale Law School, 1993) 79. 
14 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 10. 
15 MMP received 53.9 per cent of votes cast, with a voter turn-out of82.6 per cent of registered 
electors: Jack Vowles and others Towards Consensus ? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 
1995) 175. 
ic, B V Harris, above n 4, 278. 
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vote which decides the composition of the House. Each party receives a number 
of seats proportionate to the number of list votes it gains - the number of 
electorate seats won by each party is first taken into account, and is then topped 
up by candidates from the party list to make up the correct number of seats. A 
party must, however, win at least 5 per cent of the vote to be awarded its 
propo1iion of seats, to avoid a proliferation of small parties in the House, which 
might lead to instability. This threshold is waived if a party wins at least one 
electorate seat, in which case it is awarded its percentage of the party vote, even 
if this is below 5 per cent of the total. 
B Has There Been Any Constitutional Change? 
The advent of MMP has undoubtedly wrought many a change on the 
political landscape of New Zealand, but to what extent are these changes 
constitutional? A change of electoral system does not change, for example, the 
fact that New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy, based on the rule of law, 
nor that the power of Goverrunent is divided between three distinct branches, 
each with its own duties and responsibilities. It does not, in short, affect the 
skeletal framework of Government. 
One might argue, that the new electoral system has changed our political 
system, but has not in any way altered the constitution. Such a view would 
interpret a constitution as comprising a purely legal framework of principle and 
rules. The only real legislative impact of MMP has been the redrafting of the 
Electoral Act 1993, only a few provisions of which actually refer to the method 
of voting itself. This might seem insufficient to deserve being labelled a 
constitutional change. But the idea of 'constitution' encompasses more than just 
the institutions and regulations around which a State is centred. It includes the 
processes behind the rules, and the relationships that dominate the operation of 
Government in a practical sense. 17 As New Zealand has no constitutional court 
to act as the final arbitrator over constitutional questions, it is often political 
actors who, through their actions, detem1ine what our constitution is. The 
17 See Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 4 . 
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choice of political actors is therefore instrumental in determining how the 
constitution will develop to meet the changing demands of the political arena. 
The advent of MMP has been described by commentators as the "most 
substantial change to the constitution since the enactment of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990."18 It introduces the possibility of voting directly for 
one political party and its policies, as well as for an individual constituency 
candidate. The purpose of the party vote is to ensure that the composition of the 
House accurately reflects the level of support that a political party enjoys. For 
the first time, it is possible for parties to gain representation in the House 
without having a single candidate win a constituency seat. This opens up the 
political playing field to include a much broader spectrum of players, and 
removes the duopoly on representation previously enjoyed by the Labour and 
National parties. More importantly, however, MMP has changed the dynamics 
of Parliament, and, by implication, of Government. Parliament now exercises 
more power in the governmental system, and has the potential to greatly check 
the power of the executive Government. 
MMP poses such constitutional questions as: Is New Zealand truly a 
democratic nation? How are the primary actors selected? What power do they 
now wield, or choose not to wield? The answer to the latter question in 
particular depends largely on the degree of support enjoyed by those in power, 
and on how secure they feel their position is. A nominal power to act means 
little if the exercise of that power is constrained in practice. This paper focuses 
on three main ways in which the constitution has been changed. Firstly, and 
most obviously, the method of selection of the House of Representatives will 
...,, 
lead to a more representative and multifaceted legislative branch. The 
composition of the House also has a direct impact upon the composition of other 
legislative functions, such as select committees, which now play a more 
important role in the legislative process. Secondly, the more equitable 
distribution of seats among political parties acts as a restraint upon the 
18 B V Harris, above n 4, 282 ; see also Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The New Zealand 
Constitution in 2005" (2005) in Jack Hodder (Ed) New Zeala11d's Co11stitutio11al Arrangements: 
Wh ere Are We Heading? (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2005) 1, para5. 
10 
governrng party or parties, who may now be held more accountable to the 
legislative. The dynamics within the executive, particularly in cases of coalition 
Government, have also altered. The changes in the operation of the legislative 
and executive branches of Government, and in the relationship between them, 
form the focus of this paper. Lastly, the adoption of MMP has implications for 
the democratic nature of New Zealand Government. 
IV MMP AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
A The House of Representatives 
The most direct impact of MMP has been on the composition of the 
House of Representatives ("the House"), the primary organ of the legislative 
branch. The Royal Commission of Inquiry cited the likelihood that MMP would 
result in a more representative House among its primary reasons for 
recommending the introduction of MMP.
19 It was predicted that MMP would 
allow more for better representation across society, in particular representation 
of women, of ethnic minorities, and of diverse political viewpoints. This 
expectation seems to have been justified l'"'"'The current Parliament sees 35 
women holding seats - a total of 29%, which, while not reflecting the number of 
women in the population, is at least an improvement on their representation 
under FPP. There are 19 Maori MPs (including the 7 Maori seats), three Pacific 
Islanders, and two Asian MPs, including one of the Muslim faith. While 
Parliament used to be dominated by MPs with a fam1ing background, the most 
common previous occupation of MPs in the current Parliament is in business, 
followed by former teachers, lawyers, then farmers, trade unionists and 
managers or administrators. 20 The youngest MP, Darren Hughes, is just 24 
years old, while the oldest, Jim Peters, is 68. Such diversity is a great 
improvement on the composition of the House under FPP, when parties tended 
to stand middle-of-the-road candidates who would appeal to a broad class of 
mainstream New Zealand. 
19 The Royal Conm1ission on the Electoral System, above n 1, 50-51. 
20 "Composition of Parliament" <www.decisionmaker.co.nz> (last accessed 25 July 2005). 
11 
It is, however, questionable whether the mere presence of so-called 
"minorities" in Parliament really has an impact on their ability to represent other 
members of those minority groups. Take the example of a ethnically Chinese 
Member of Parliament - if elected as a constituency MP, he or she is under an 
obligation to represent all members of that constituency; if as a list member then 
arguably the obligation is towards voters who voted for the party from whose 
list he or she was elected. In neither case is there evidence for the proposition 
that members of the Chinese community in New Zealand, or their particular 
interests, wi 11 be better represented. 
Ashraf Choudhary, New Zealand's first South Asian and Muslim MP, is 
a Labour list MP. Dr Choudhary has faced some difficulties in reconciling the 
expectations of his party (to whom he owes his seat in Parliament) with the 
expectations of Muslim New Zealanders. In 2003, for example, Dr Choudhary 
abstained from voting on the Prostitution Reform Bill, allowing the legislation 
to decriminalise prostitution to go through with a majority of one vote. In 2004, 
he again caused controversy amongst the Muslim community by voting in 
favour of the Civil Union Bill, allowing homosexual as well as heterosexual 
couples to enter into a legally recognised relationship. Dr Choudhary has since 
been subjected to criticism for comments he has made regarding Islamic 
practices of stoning homosexuals on a New Zealand current affairs television 
show,21 comments which Prime Minister Helen Clark was quick to disassociate 
the paiiy from, and which Choudhary subsequently modified. The power of the 
political power has not diminished under MMP, and remains paramount in 
Parliament - although members of a minority group may feel some affiliation to 
a member who appears to identify with them, in reality MPs are obliged to 
follow party line in most matters, and even under a conscience vote may be 
forced to consider the expectations of a wider voting public. The very fact that 
Parliament seems more representative of a range of New Zealand identities, 
however, increases its appearance of legitimacy. 
2 1 See for example "Some stoning okay says Choudhary" New Zealand Herald (5 July 2005). 
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MMP has increased representation m another more crucial manner -
through the representation of different political viewpoints manifested by the 
various political parties. Whereas under FPP there were generally two, or 
sometimes three, parties represented, the current Parliament contains members 
of eight parties.22 As it is the party vote which determines the number of seats 
each party holds in the House, for the first time small parties have the 
opportunity to gain seats according to their nationwide support level, without 
necessarily being obliged to win an electorate seat. Essentially, in choosing to 
whom to give their party vote, voters are choosing between sets of political 
policies on a range of issues.23 Under FPP, there were only two viable options, 
both of which tended to gravitate towards the middle ground in order to win 
swinging voters. New Zealand has traditionally had a unidimensional political 
scene,24 but under MMP, there may be a wide range of ideologies represented. 
Instead of fitting into the traditional Left-Right spectrum, parties may focus on a 
particular issue or range of issues, one example being the Green Party with its 
ecological focus. It is to be hoped the more representative nature of Parliament 
under MMP will increase public confidence in the democratic process. The 
impact of MMP on the legitimacy of Parliament in a democratic nation is 
discussed below in Part VI. 25 
B More Representative Legislation? 
The principle function of Parliament is to enact legislation. While a 
more representative House may allow for livelier and more diverse political 
debate, some commentators have submitted that this comes at the cost of 
efficiency and expediency. The New Zealand Parliament has been described as 
a "hands-on" one. 26 By this is meant that the Government no longer completely 
controls the legislative programme, and that MPs may have a substantial input 
22 Labour, Progressive Coalition, United Future, Greens, National, ACT, NZ First and the Maori 
Party. 
23 M Laver and K Shepsle Making a11d Breaking Governments: Cabin ets a11d l egislatures in 
Par/iamentwy Democracies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
24 Aimer, above n 11 , 273 . 
25 See Part VI Democracy and MMP. 
26 George Tanner, Report of the Parliamentary Counsel Office for the year ending 30 June 2004, 
10. 
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into the design and content of legislation during its passage through Parliament. 
In particular, the Select Committee stage of the legislative process may lead to 
extensive revision of a Bill, which, when reported back to the House, may bear 
little resemblance to the Bill as introduced. The Committee stage in the House 
may see still further amendments proposed (either by Government or by 
Opposition members), debated, and accepted. In the year ending 30 June 2005, 
127 Supplementary Order Papers suggesting amendments to Bills before the 
Committee of the Whole House were introduced, all of which had to be then 
considered and voted upon. Deputy Chief Parliamentary Counsel Geoff Lawn 
has questioned the impact of MMP on the efficiency of the legislative process, 
claiming that it is now harder for Parliamentary Counsel to draft legislation that 
conveys a clear and consistent policy design, owing to the increased amount of 
political negotiation that is necessary, in some cases right up to and including 
the Committee of the Whole House stage. 27 In general, the legislative process 
under MMP is subject to much more intense scrutiny than under FPP, however, 
in some case the political negotiations may simply result in an Act which fails to 
implement the desired policy because of the need to compromise in order to gain 
support for its passage through Parliament. 
The new tendency for amendments to Bills to be made after introduction 
bas other implications for the quality of legislation passed. It affects, for 
example, the ability of the Attorney General to vet Bills for compliance with the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, as required by section 7 of that Act. As Bill of Rights 
vets are completed before a Government Bill is introduced to the House, any 
suggested amendments by the Select Committee, or amendments introduced 
through a Supplementary Order Paper at the Committee of the whole House 
stage, risk being in conflict with the Bill of Rights without attention being drawn 
to this fact. At a lower, but still very real, level of concern, the number of 
changes to legislation being made under intense time restraints may lead to 
mistakes, which cannot then be changed after the third reading. Only mistakes 
of a typographic or fornrntting nature may be rectified before the assent copy of 
a Bill is signed. Any other mistakes, even if noticed at the time, may only be 
27 Geoff Lawn "Improving Public Access to Legislation" (Public Law Conference 2001, 
Wellington, 4 April 2001). 
14 
coITected through subsequent legislation. A possible cure to these MMP 
maladies might be to allow a Minister to call for a Bill which has been subject to 
changes in the Committee of the whole House to be resubmitted to Committee 
without putting this to the vote.28 This would allow the amendment provisions 
to be rechecked in light of the policy of the Bill as a whole, leading to more 
coherent legislation, as well as ensuring that the amendment provisions do not 
cause any issues of compatibility with the Bill of Rights Act. As the legislative 
process stands, the legislation produced by an MMP Parliament may be more 
acceptable in a democratic sense but may not be any better than that produced 
under FPP. The production of clear and consistent legislation is one of the vital 
roles of a Parliamentary democracy. While not suggesting that this is under 
tlu·eat in New Zealand, this author submits that changes could be introduced at a 
procedural level to safeguard the ability of Parliament to ensure that all 
amendments to legislation have gone through the necessary checks. 
Until 2003, the legislative output since the introduction of MMP had 
dropped by about one-third compared with the rate under FPP, prompting 
reassurances that "New Zealand [was] no longer the fastest law-maker in the 
West". 29 This could be interpreted as a sign of the House taking back its role of 
giving legitimacy to the laws which it believes should be passed, and in the fonn 
that it believes will be acceptable to the majority of voters, rather than the 
Government having unchecked power to determine the content of all legislation. 
Under an MMP system of elections, there is an increased likelihood of either a 
coalition or a single party minority Government. In the case of a coalition, 
political power is shared with the minor partner in the coalition, often 
disproportionately to the actual amount of representation they have in the House. 
However the power of Government does remain within the coalition agreement, 
with little power being devolved upon other parties in the House.
30 In the case 
of a minority Government, however, minor parties in the House become more 
politically effective, as the governing party will be forced to negotiate support 
28 See Tarrner, above n 26, 40. 
29 Palmer and Palmer, above n 14, 371. 
30 Steven Condie Impact of MMP 0 11 Select Committee Scrutiny of l egislation (LLM Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1996) 2. 
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for their policies. 31 The balance of power under MMP will depend, then, on 
whether the Government of the day enjoys majority support in the House, or 
whether it relies on another party, or parties for support. The present 
Government, for example, has received an undertaking of support on confidence 
in supply from the United Future Party,32 but will still be obliged to negotiate 
with both United Future and with their alternative supporting party, the Greens, 
over areas of particular interest to them to gain support for individual legislative 
policies. Whether or not a Government is able to implement its legislative 
policies depends on political negotiation 
MMP guarantees a decrease in neither the amount of legislation, nor the 
speed with which it is passed. The following graph shows that, allowing for the 
three year legislative cycle around election years, the number of Bills passed 
under MMP steadily decreased for several years, but has begun to rise again the 
past two years: 
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32 Agreement for Confidence and Supply between the Labour/Progressive Government and the 
United Futme Parliamentary Caucus (8 August 2002) ("Agreement for Confidence and Supply"). 
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Still , even with this recent increase, it is clear that MMP has curbed the ability 
of the Government to pass Government Bills. One concern in this regard is that 
a Government may compensate for the new difficulty in passing primary 
legislation, by enacting an increased number ofregulations. Contrary to popular 
assumptions, the number of regulations, although slightly higher, has not sky-
rocketed in relation to the amount of primary legislation passed. In the years 
ending in June 2000 and 2001, both the number of Acts and the number of 
regulations were lower than in the preceding two years. In general, however, 
there has been an steady increase: 
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Fears of MMP producing ineffective Governments have been unfounded: 
a strong Government still has the ability to pass the measures it wants to. But, 
in cases of a minority government, there may still be a temptation to provide for 
more delegated legislation, to circumvent the lengthening process of passing 
through primary legislation. Parliament now sits on fewer days than it used to, 
and it takes longer to pass Bills through the processes of the House, particularly 
matters that do not carry any strong political weight, or attract a lot of media 
17 
interest. That said, the process of taking Bills under urgency still allows a 
Government to push through a particular policy issue rapidly, especially during 
the last stages of the Bill. This could be seen in the recent passage of the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. Changes made by Supplementary Order Paper 
to this Bill were accepted and passed without being subject to further scrutiny by 
Select Committee, the public, or even, to any real extent, by other political 
. JJ 
parties. A greater level of inter-party consultation and negotiation is 
necessary to ensure that the Government has the numbers for its proposals, but 
these negotiations are usually carried out before a Bill is ever introduced to the 
House. 34 
C Makiug and Breaking Governments 
l Government formation 
A key feature of the New Zealand parliamentary system is the idea of 
responsible Government - the executive is accountable to the legislative branch, 
and relies on its support for legitimacy. MMP has gone some way towards 
restoring to Parliament its traditional role of making and breaking Governments. 
If no one party has gained enough seats in the House to form a Government on 
its own, the party (or parties) with the most seats will be obliged to negotiate 
with other paiiies in order to gain enough support to govern. Critics of MMP 
would denounce this as one of the evils of MMP, saying that it gives too much 
power to minor parties.35 For example, the outcome of the 1996 election, the 
first under MMP, gave 44 seats to the National Party, and 37 seats to Labour. 
The balance of power was held by the New Zealand First Party, with 17 seats. 
After a lengthy period of negotiation, New Zealand First entered into a coalition 
with National, despite having indicated prior to the election that it was more 
likely to enter a coalition with Labour, and indeed having campaigned on the 
basis that a vote for New Zealand First would see National removed from 
Government. Tn this scenario, many of those who voted for New Zealand First 
33 Professor Jim Evans and Richard Ekins, Submission to the Constitutional Arrangements 
Committee of Parliament (April 2005). 
34 See McDowell and Webb, above n 8, 78-80. 
35 See for example Graeme Hunt Why MMP Must Go - the Case/or Ditching the Electoral 
Disaster of the Centu,y (Waddington Press, Auckland, 1998). 
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ended up with what they had thought they were voting against - a National-led 
Government. With such an outcome, there is a danger of voters returning to the 
FPP, two-paiiy mentality: the only way to oust a Government is to vote for the 
other large party, as any small party could mislead voters as to their intentions 
post-election, and thus misuse the power they have been given. 
Smaller parties are now tending to structure their election campaigns 
around how successfully they could enter into a coalition Government with one 
of the larger parties. The real issue for voters is portrayed as being not which 
party will gain the most seats in parliament, but rather what minor parties will be 
there to support them, and what the relationship between these parties will be. 
United Future, for example, is campaigning for the 2005 election on its proven 
ability to work together with either National or Labour, providing the best 
option for voters who want to ensure a secure and stable Government.36 NZ 
First, meanwhile, has made it clear that if it were in a position to form a 
coalition, it would not feel bound to give support to the party that won the most 
votes, but would rather choose to support the party with which it could negotiate 
the best deal after the election. 37 Should parties then be obliged to give some 
indication prior to an election as to which parties they would be willing to form 
a Government with? And should they be obliged to carry through with these 
indications, once voiced? It is submitted that this is an area which is best left to 
the pressures of the political arena to regulate, rather than any legal rule. Both 
the formation and maintenance of Government is an essentially political process, 
which cannot be regulated through an obligation to uphold promises made 
before the outcome of an election is known. Even if parties were under an 
obligation to determine their coalition partners pre-election, there is no 
guarantee that the Government thus formed would survive the full, three-year, 
parliamentary term. The process of fonning a Government immediately after an 
election must be left to the leaders of the political parties represented in the 
House - those with the greatest number of seats, and those with the requisite 
numbers to act as a 'support' party. In many European parliamentary 
democracies, the Head of State will appoint an informateur to investigate what 
36 "United Future an ally in stability" <www.stuff.co.nz> (last accessed 8 June 2005). 
37 "NZ First gets in first with campaign launch" <www.stuff.co.nz> (last accessed 8 June 2005). 
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Government fom1ation would be most viable, and on the informateur's 
recommendation will then appoint a formateur to go about the process of 
forming a Government. This is often, but not always, the leader of the largest 
pai1y. Former Governor General Sir Michael Hardie Boys, when faced with 
question of how Governments would be appointed under MMP, made it very 
clear that it would continue to be a purely political process, and that no 
formateur as such would be appointed until political negotiation had made it 
clear which combination of parties would be likely to be able to form a viable 
Government. 38 
2 Maintaining a stable Government 
Once a Government is fonned, it will need to ensure it can maintain 
unity and cooperation within itself, and, in the case of a minority Government, 
also retain the support of any smaller parties it may be relying on for confidence 
and supply. Here again, increased negotiation and willingness to compromise 
wi II be required - the governing party will not be able to simply rely on being 
able to implement their policy initiatives without amendment. A Cabinet 
Government owes its existence to the continued support of a majority of 
legislators. 39 This may not mean that the legislature considers the existing 
Cabinet to be the ideal Government, but rather the one that is the best out of all 
viable options. From an inverse perspective then, "a Cabinet remains in office 
as long as a majority of legislators cannot agree on a preferred alternative 
Cabinet." 40 Although a Government, once in office, exercises considerable 
power in matters of policy development and legislative direction, it does so at 
the pleasure of the legislature. Traditional theories of Parliainentary democracy 
38 Rt Hon Hardie Boys "The Role of the Governor-General under MMP" (Speech to the Annual 
Dinner of the Institute oflnternational Affairs, Wellington, 24 May 1996); Rt Hon Hardie Boys 
"Continuity and Change: The 1996 General Election and the Role of the Governor-General" 
( 1997 Harkness Henry Lecture, University of Waikato, 31 July 1997) ( 1997) 5 Waikato LR l. 
For further reading see also Caroline Morris The Governor-General, the Reserve Powers. 
Parliament and MMP: A New Era (LLB(Hons) Legal Writing Requirement, Victoria University 
of Wellington, 1994). 
39 M Laver and K Shepsle (Eds) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamenta,y Government (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1994) 3 ("Cabin et Ministers and Parliamenta,y Government "). 
40 Laver and Shepsle, above n 23, 49. 
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assume that the executive is controlled by the legislature,41 but the overlap in 
membership between the two branches means that the extent to which this is 
true depends on the mathematics of Government formation. Under a single-
party, majority Government, as was the norm under FPP, the governing party 
also controls numbers in the House, and will hence be unlikely to lose a vote of 
confidence in its right to govern. If two or more parties constitute a majority 
Government, the Government can be presumed to control the House and its 
legislative programme as long as the coalition agreement holds strong. In other 
words, the majority of legislators are bound to parties which have entered into 
an agreement to govern with each other. However, a minority Government 
cannot take for granted the support of the House. 
3 Challenges for minority Government 
Under a minority Government, the Government's support partner(s) may 
do more than just make or break the Government - they also have the potential 
to mould it, at least to a small extent. Not only may the legislature chose the 
Government which it finds most palatable from the viable options available to it, 
it may also dictate some of the terms upon which it will give its support to the 
Government chosen. Thus, a smaller party may say then it will guarantee its 
support to a minority Government on the condition that certain promises are 
upheld, or certain policies pursued. Under the current support agreement 
between the Government and United Future, the United Future guarantee is 
dependant on the Govenunent including several of United Future's primary 
policies in its legislative programme. Smaller parties are not going to be able to 
dictate the main thrust of a Government's agenda, but may be able to shift some 
of the focus in the direction desired by them, or away from a direction they do 
not condone. United Future, for example, secured an undertaking from the 
Government that it would not change the legal status of cannabis in this 
par! iamentary term, 42 which, while not a specific Labour Party policy, might 
potentially have been used as a bargaining tool when dealing with the alternative 
suppo1i party, the Greens. 
41 See Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentwy Government, above n 39, 4. 
42 Agreement for Confidence and Supply, above n 32, 1. 
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D Select Committee Scrutiny 
l Legislative Scrutiny 
When compared with other Parliamentary democracies, New Zealand 
possesses few constitutional safeguards against the abuse of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. We have no supreme law Constitution, no constitutional Court to 
review legislative and executive action, and, since 1950, no Upper House to 
check the passage of legislation through the House. The New Zealand select 
committee process acts as an internal check on the legislative branch, similar to 
the function exercised by Upper Houses in other jurisdiction.
43 The practice 
that Bills be refen-ed to a select committee for scrutiny and comment is 
comparable to the second tier of scrutiny which an upper House would carry out. 
However, a select committee has no power to veto a proposal, or even to enforce 
amendments. Select committee approval is likewise not a pre-requisite for the 
passing of a Bill. 
Most Bills are refen-ed to a select committee after their first reading, 
where they are subject to public submissions and scrutiny. Select committees in 
New Zealand have the power to make substantial changes to a Bill, although 
these changes are of course subject to subsequent approval by the House. 
Usually, the suggestions that are submitted in a select committee report will 
relate to the detail of a legislative proposal, rather than the policy behind it, as 
this will already have been the subject of inter-party dialogue and negotiation. 
Sometimes, however, the careful consideration of a piece of legislation may 
clarify what the policy behind the proposal is. Recommendations of the 
Committee can also guide a Government proposal in a direction which takes 
into consideration the views of the public, to make the final product seem more 
acceptable. An example of a Bill which underwent severe select committee 
scrutiny is the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill, the companion to the 
Civil Union Bill. The purpose of the Bill was to give effect to the Civil Union 
43 Palmer and Palmer, above n 14,37 1. 
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Bill across the statute books, and to amend existing legislation which contained 
unjustifiable discrimination on the grounds of marital status or sexual 
orientation, by including references to civil unions and de facto relationships 
alongside references to marriage. The committee was faced with the task of 
working through approximately 180 pieces of legislation - in each individual 
case they considered whether the proposed amendments were in keeping with 
the intention of the statute or regulation being amended.
44 The committee came 
to the conclusion that giving civil union and de facto relationship partners the 
same rights and obligations and married partners in every case might be contrary 
to specific legislative purposes, or simply unnecessary to accomplish the real 
aim of eliminating discrimination. They also recommended that, even where 
identical rights and obligations were given, the terminology used in each case 
should still distinguish between civil union partners and married partners, to 
reflect the views of members of the public who did not want to see the status of 
marriage undermined. Although the recommendations of the committee made 
little difference to the core policy of the initial proposal, they did clarify that the 
policy was not to equate all types of relationships, but rather to provide 
protection to all equally, and to align the rights and obligations of each where 
this was deemed to be appropriate. 
The power of the select committee to recommend amendments to 
legislation is comparable to the powers of an Upper House in other 
Parliamentary democracies. In the United Kingdom, for example, the House of 
Lords is able to recommend amendments to all Bills, with the exception of Bills 
relating to taxation. All amendments must then be referred back to the House of 
Commons for acceptance. The House of Lords lacks the power to reject a Bill 
outright - it may delay the passage of a Bill for up to 12 months, but it may then 
be passed by the House of Commons alone.
45 Its function is to act as a "revising 
chamber" for important or complex pieces of legislation. 
46 This is the same 
function as that carried out by a select committee. In the same way as an Upper 
House is seen to be complementary to a Lower House, select committees 
44 Justice and Electoral Conunittee "Report on the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill", 2. 
45 "Role of the House of Lords" <www.parliament.uk> (last accessed 25 July 2005). 
46 "Role of the House of Lords", above n 45 . 
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complement the House of Representatives in its legislative role by carrying out 
the necessary, in-depth and critical scrutiny of legislation that the House lacks 
the time and expe1iise to undertake. 
2 Membership 
[n an MMP Parliament, the membership of select committees is allocated 
on the basis of proportionality - the number of select committee positions a 
paiiy has reflects its representation in the House. 
47 The Government is no 
longer assured of having a majority in each select committee. Smaller parties 
will, of course, not be represented in every select committee, but may negotiate 
to sit on committees that consider their particular areas of concern. As the 
proportionality requirement extends over select committee membership as a 
whole, rather than each committee individually, it is possible for some 
committees to have a Government majority while others do not. Under MMP, 
select committees function more as Parliamentary committees, rather than as a 
designation of the Executive. 48 Cabinet Ministers do not sit on select 
committees, to further the separation between the legislative and executive 
branches. 49 They may, however, be called to appear before committees to 
explain their policies and actions. This has been an important step in increasing 
the accountability of Ministers to Parliament, which functions more effectively 
in an MMP environment. 50 
Although the membership of Select Committees now reflects the 
membership of the House, party representation does not determine the number 
of select committee chairs each party receives. In the first MMP parliament, 
only one of the 12 subject committees was not chaired by a Government MP, 
with the senior coalition partner, National, chairing 10 committees. This is 
probably because the committees elect their own chairs, and as the majority 
Government enjoyed a majority in Select Committees the majority rule 
47 Standing Orders 185( 1 ). 
48 The MMP Review Committee " Report on the Inquiry into the Review of MMP" [2001] 
AJHR I2 3A 37. 
49 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 174. 
50 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 174. 
24 
continued to prevail.51 In the current Parliament, 5 out of the 18 subject Select 
Committees are chaired by non-Government Members. The Privileges 
Committee is chaired by Matt Robson, member of the coalition Progressive 
Party. The Government's support parties have the chair of committees which 
reflect their special interests - the Green's Jeanette Fitzsimons chairs the Local 
Government and Environment Committee, for example, while United Future's 
Peter Dunne chairs the Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee (as well as the 
special Committee set up to investigate New Zealand's constitutional 
arrangements). New Zealand First chairs one committee and the National Party 
two. As the select committee chair no longer enjoys a casting vote, this 
privilege is not as significant as it once was, and in practice the chair of a select 
committee has little more than a procedural role in chairing meetings and 
presenting reports anyway. Yet if select committees are to be seen as clearly an 
arm of the legislative, rather than the executive, branch, an argument could be 
made that select committee chairs should also reflect the proportionality of the 
House. Perhaps consideration could be given to introducing a guideline in the 
Standing Orders to this effect, although it might be difficult to implement under 
the current practice of each committee electing its own chair. 
3 Select Committee Inquiries 
Select Committees do not only consider potential pieces of legislation -
a further function is to conduct inquiries into matters of Government policy, 
administration and expenditure. Such inquiries have become more common in 
the MMP enviromnent. 52 While Select Committees in 1997 conducted only four 
inquiries, by 2001 this had increased to fourteen, and so far in 2004 select 
committees have reported back to the House on twenty two areas of inquiry. 
The increase in select committee inquiries may reflect the fact that list MPs do 
not have the responsibility of looking after a constituency and can therefore put 
more energy into particular issues of concern. 53 A further factor is that if 
committees are not dominated by Government MPs, there is potentially more 
51 Philip Joseph "The New Parliament" (1997) NZLR 233. 
52 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 170-171. 
5
-' Steven Condie, above n 30, 23. 
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scope for them to carry out a thorough investigation into Government policies or 
actions and come to conclusions which may differ from the official Government 
position. This would scarcely have been possible under FPP.54 In this respect 
also , select committees mirror the role of an Upper House in other jurisdictions, 
which also have the ability to question the Government, thus acting as a further 
restraint on executive power. The development of this function of select 
committees is a significant shift in the constitutional power balance, especially 
as this is one check which should prevail regardless of the power dynamics in 
the House itself. Even were there a majority Government, it could be expected 
that select committees would continue to conduct meaningful inquiries into 
Government activity. 
E The Business Committee 
The Business Committee was established to coincide with the first MMP 
Parliament, although there may have been other factors which contributed to its 
existence. 55 This committee now recommends a programme of sittings for each 
calendar year, 56 a role which used to rest solely in the hands of the Government. 
Under the Standing Orders, the membership of the committee comprises one 
member of every party with at least 6 seats, one member to represent small 
coalition partners, and one member to represent all other smaller parties. 57 
However in practice, each party represented in the House is also represented in 
the Business Committee. The Committee also decides: 58 
• the order of business to be transacted in the House 
• the time to be spent on an item of business 
• how time on an item is to be allocated among the parties represented in the 
House 
• the speaking times for individuals on an item of business. 
54 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 172. 
55 Mary Harris "How is Parliament Performing Under MMP?" (July 2002) NZLR, 233. 
56 Standing Order 78 . 
57 Standing Order 74 . 
58 Standing Order 76. 
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The creation of the Business Committee aids in distinguishing the House 
of Representatives from the executive branch of Government - it is the House 
itself which determines its agenda and procedure, rather than this being dictated 
by the Government. 
V IMPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT 
MMP overturned two of the main features of FPP which allowed the 
executive branch to monopolise the exercise of power in New Zealand: the 
dominance of two main political parties to the detriment of smaller parties, and 
the outcome of a single-party, majority Government. Under FPP, New Zealand 
was ruled by a strong executive Government. The leader of the party which 
won the most seats in Parliament would form a Government by advising the 
Governor-General to appoint his59 most senior colleagues to positions on the 
Executive Council. These Ministers would almost certainly also be appointed to 
Cabinet, and awarded Ministerial portfolios. The convention of collective 
responsibility in Cabinet meant that Cabinet spoke with one voice, and was able 
to exert considerable influence on the members of the governing party's 
caucus. 60 With a majority in the House, the governing party could thus pass 
any legislation, and implement any policy, it desired with very little resistance. 
With the proportional nature of MMP granting seats to parties on the 
basis of their level of support across the country, it is now much less likely that 
one party will gain enough seats to govern completely on its own.6 1 Coalition 
government is not unique to MMP - the Government formed after the last FPP 
election in 1993 was a coalition between the National and United Parties. 
However, under MMP, there is an increased chance of a coalition Government, 
either majority or minority, or of a single-party minority Government. A 
coalition is the most likely outcome. The first MMP election in 1996 resulted in 
a coalition between the National and New Zealand First Parties, which collapsed 
59 There were no female Prime Ministers under FPP. 
60 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 10. 
6 1 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 14. 
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part-way through the Parliamentary term and was succeeded by a minority 
National Government. The 1999 election saw the formation of a Labour-
Alliance minority Government, which relied on the support of the Greens to 
govern. When the Alliance party split in two mid-way through 2002, an early 
election was called, which again resulted in the formation of a minority coalition 
Government, this time between Labour and the Progressive Coalition. 
Cabinet is a prime example of how constitutional and political realities 
depart from the legal framework of Government. Although not possessing any 
statutory mandate, Cabinet is "the central decision making body of executive 
Government".62 Political scientist Elizabeth McLeay emphasised the power of 
Cabinet prior to MMP, describing it as:63 
A political executive untroubled by challenges to its hegemony by an interfering 
and retarding upper house, by federal components to the political system with 
their own sources of power and authority, by judicial review of its decisions 
or . . . by troublesome, multi-party parliaments. 
All important Governmental decisions are made in Cabinet. In an FPP-
elected Parliament, the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility, together 
with strict party discipline and the influence of senior Ministers within Caucus, 
meant that a decision of Cabinet was almost guaranteed to have the support of 
the governing party, and therefore a majority in the House. The likelihood of a 
coalition Cabinet being appointed following an MMP election raises issues as to 
the relationship between the coalition partners, and the processes by which they 
will come to agreements and make decisions in order to govern effectively. The 
traditional conventions governing Cabinet decision-making and Ministerial 
behaviour have taken on new meanings under MMP. 
02 Cabinet Office Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 200 I) . 
03 Elizabeth McLeay The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1995) 6. 
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A Collective Responsibility 
l Party disagreement 
The effective operation of Cabinet hinges on the doctrine of collective 
Cabinet responsibility, which requires all Ministers to publicly give their support 
to every decision made by Cabinet, whether or not they agree with them 
personally. This convention ensures that Government is seen to be speaking 
with one voice, and acting with one agenda. The Cabinet Office Manual has 
this to say about the convention:64 
The principle of collective responsibility underpins the system of Cabinet 
Government. It reflects democratic principle: the House expresses its 
confidence in the collective whole of Government, rather than in individual 
Ministers. Similarly, the Governor-General, in acting on ministerial advice, 
needs to be confident that individual Ministers represent official Government 
policy. In all areas of their work, therefore, Ministers represent and implement 
Government policy. 
This was one of the challenges faced by the first MMP Government, 
which was comprised of two parties whose succession to the House had hinged 
on quite different election campaigns. The National-NZ First Government 
fom1ed in 1996 did not attempt to circumvent the doctrine at all, however. The 
Cabinet Office Manual of 1996 continued to state that "once a decision has been 
made [ at a Cabinet or Cabinet Committee meeting] it is to be supported 
collectively by all Ministers, regardless of their personal views and whether or 
not they were at the meeting concemed". 65 The expectation remained that all 
members of Cabinet would adhere to the duty of collectivity, despite the 
sometimes very different political philosophies of the two parties represented. 
Indeed, the Coalition Agreement went even further than the traditional 
understanding of collective responsibility (which applies only to ministers), and 
went so far as to expressly forbid either party from voting for or supporting 
<•4 Cabinet Office, above n 62, 3.2 . 
65 Cabinet Office, above n 62, 3.4. 
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legislation without the written consent of the other party. 
66 This commitment to 
a strict application of intra-Governmental discipline eventually led to a 
dissolution of the Coalition Agreement, when ongoing differences between the 
two parties prevented further cooperation. 
The lessons of 1996 seemed well-learned in 1999, when the Labour and 
Alliance parties were negotiating their coalition agreement. For the first time, 
the doctrine of collective responsibility was expressly amended to allow 
members of the two parties to agree to classify particular issues as being matters 
of "party distinction", in cases where a distinctive policy matter raises an issue 
of importance to the party's political identity.
67 This would allow the minor 
coalition partner to publicly state that they did not agree with a particular 
decision that had been made in Cabinet. However the proviso to the rule neither 
allowed individual MPs to dissent from Cabinet decisions, nor relieved coalition 
partners of the obligation to fully implement policies which had been 
collectively agreed on. The ability to agree to disagree merely gave minor 
coalition partners a chance to indicate that they had not backed down in theory 
from their election promises, but that in practice they did not have the numbers 
to implement them. This is important in allowing smaller parties to maintain the 
confidence of the voters who have given them the mandate to enter Government 
in the first place. The changes in understanding of the doctrine of collective 
responsibility in a coalition Government were reflected in the amended Cabinet 
Manual of 2001. The relevant provisions now read:
68 
3.22 In a coalition Government, Ministers are expected to show careful judgement 
when referring to party policy that differs from Government policy. Subject 
to paragraph 3.23 , a Minister's support and responsibility for the collective 
Government position must always be clear. 
3.23 Coalition Governments may decide to establish "agree to disagree" processes, 
which may allow Ministers to maintain, in public, different party positions on 
particular issues or policies. Once the final outcome of any "agree to 
disagree" issue or policy has been determined ( either at the Cabinet level or 
c,c, National-New Zealand First Coalition Agreement 1996, Rule 4.2a. 
67 The Coalition Agreement between the Labour and Alliance Parties (6 December 1999). 
68 Cabinet Office, above n 62, 3.22-3.24. 
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through some other agreed process), Ministers must implement the resulting 
decision or legislation, regardless of their position throughout the decision 
making process. 
3.24 "Agree to disagree" processes may only be used in relation to different party 
positions. Any public dissociation from Cabinet decisions by individual 
Ministers outside the agreed processes is unacceptable. 
The current coalition partners have also entered into a coalition 
agreement which allows them to agree to disagree as set out in the Cabinet 
Manual. In addition, the Labour-Progressive Government has entered into 
agreements of support with both the Green and United Future Parties. These 
agreements outline the level of consultation and cooperation to be expected 
between Govenm1ent and its supporting parties, and seem to imply that, 
although not strictly bound by collective responsibility, the supporting parties 
will be expected to comply with the doctrine in certain defined situations.
69 
2 Individual disagreement 
As stated above, the now accepted exception to the doctrine of collective 
responsibility does not apply to individual ministers who choose to speak out 
against a decision of Cabinet. However, there seem to be an increasing number 
of such breaches under MMP. 
a) John Tamihere 
ln February 2003, the then Associate Minister of Maori Affairs, the Hon 
John Tamihere, made a speech to the Knowledge Wave Conference condemning 
current Government policies in relation to Maori underachievement.
70 Tamihere 
highlighted the failings of the Ministry of Social Development in addressing 
Maori concerns, and advocated the decentralisation of the Ministry as the only 
69 Co-operation Agreement between the Labour/Progressive Government and the Green 
Parliamentary Caucus (26 August 2002) ("Co-operation Agreement"); Agreement for 
Confidence and Supply, above n 32. See Part IV C 2 Agreements of supply and support. 
70 John Tamihere, Associate Minister for Maori Affairs "The Reform of Welfare and the 
Rebuilding of the Community" (Knowledge Wave 2003 - the Leadership Forum, Auckland, 21 
February 2003 ). 
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way forward. In the week following the speech, Tamihere also directly 
criticised the then Minister for Social Development, Steve Maharey. 
71 
Tamihere stepped out of line in five respects:
72 
1. He attacked a Cabinet colleague. 
2. He made a statement on a portfolio area outside his area of 
Ministerial responsibility. 
3. He attacked Government policy. 
4. He was in breach of the principle of collective responsibility. 
5. Some of the statements he made were factually wrong in any event. 
However, despite the clear breach of collective responsibility, he escaped the 
usual political sanction of dismissal from Cabinet. Tamihere was forced to 
apologise for his criticism of Government policy, but did not actually retract any 
of his remarks. Prime Minister Helen Clark, meanwhile, reiterated that it was 
inappropriate for Ministers to "bag" their colleagues or to comment on another 
Minister's po1ifolio, but also stated that the speech was capable of either a 
benign or a malign interpretation. 
73 In choosing to treat Tamihere's 
misdemeanours so lightly, Clark was obviously taking the former option, and 
was encouraging others to do likewise. 
At some levels, there seemed to be an acceptance that, while Tamihere 
may have acted inappropriately, he did at least know what he was talking about. 
He was seen as having more first-hand knowledge of how Maori were affected 
by social policy than the rest of his Cabinet colleagues. 
74 He was also seen to be 
voicing beliefs that enjoyed a high level of popular support, both from the 
general public and from interest groups - beliefs that were simply being ignored 
7 1 See (25 February 2003) 606 NZPD 3694 
72 Chen Palmer & Partners Wellington Watch : A Weekly Bulletin of Parliamenta,y and Political 
!11for111atio11 issue 2003/6 (28 Febrnary 2003). 
73 (25 February 2003) 606 NZPD 3686. 
74 Colin James "Navigating the transition to a new generation's country" (25 February 2003) NZ 
Herald Auckland. See also Interview with Mai Chen, (Mike Hoskings, Breakfast, TV One, 5 
March 2003) ChenPalmer Archive - Transcripts 2003 at <www.chenpalmer.co.nz> (last 
accessed 18 July 2005). 
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by the Government cronies in power.
75 These factors contributed to the decision 
to allow Tamihere to continue in Cabinet, albeit with slightly lower levels of 
confidence in his commitment to Government. 
b) Tariana Turia 
Another example which received much critical media attention was the 
position of Labour Minister Tariana Turia on the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 
2004. During the weeks leading up to the final vote, Turia maintained that she 
would vote the way her constih1ents wanted her to, not the way her party 
· d 76 require . She indicated that she would refuse to support the Bill on the 
grounds that it was detrimental to the interests of many of her constituents in the 
Maori electorate of Tai Hauauru. At this time, Turia was a Minister outside of 
Cabinet but was nevertheless bound by the constraints of collective 
responsibility. 
The response of Prime Minister Helen Clark to Turia's blatant disregard 
of the convention was that, as Prime Minister, it was her role to "determine what 
the bounds of manoeuvre for Ministers are".
77 Initially, when Turia stated her 
intention of voting against the Government it appeared that her dismissal from 
Cabinet would be imminent. However, at a subsequent meeting with Helen 
Clark a week before the Bill was debated, Clark reputedly set .out four options 
for Turia to consider: abstain and keep her ministerial post; absent herself from 
Parliament and keep her ministerial post; vote against and resign from her post, 
and be rehabilitated once the legislation is passed; and vote against and be 
sacked. 78 
As it eventuated, Turia did resign both her Ministerial portfolios and her 
seat in the House before further sanctions were imposed. But in the 
circumstances in question, it was clear that it was really other political 
75 Denis Dutton "Tamihere walking in footsteps of Roosevelt" (4 April 2003) NZ Herald 
Auckland. 
76 Tariana Turia (27 April 2004, Media Statement). 
77 (11 December 2003) 614 NZPD 10658. 
78 Chen Palmer & Partners Wellington Watch: A Weekly Bulletin of Parliamenta,y and Political 
Information Issue 2004/15 (30 April 2004). 
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I 
considerations which were determining the Prime Minister's response. The 
Government would have preferred not to face a by-election in the Tai Hauauru 
electorate in the event of Turia resigning her seat in Parliament, and was also 
anxious not to appear to be alienating members of the Maori caucus. The 
decision on what sanction, if any, is appropriate in cases of breach of collective 
responsibility has always essentially been a political one. The sanctions 
available range from a private reprimand up to dismissal from Cabinet, with the 
choice of procedure lying in the hands of the Prime Minister and her Cabinet 
colleagues. Intra- and inter-party politics will always be a factor in determining 
what is acceptable behaviour for politicians, but this appears to have been 
exacerbated under MMP, particularly in minority Governments. It may be more 
politically expedient for a Government to allow minor breaches of the 
convention to escape unsanctioned, if it is clear that the Minister perpetrating the 
breach has the support of other tactically significant factions - either within 
Government, within the House or in the public arena. As "[ c Jollective 
responsibility is one of the factors in producing strong Executive control over 
Parliament" 79 , the apparent loosening of the strict application of collective 
responsibility shows yet again the reduction in executive power under MMP. 
B Individual Mi11isterial Respo11sibility 
Matthew Palmer suggests that the convention of individual ministerial 
responsibility has three distinct elements:80 
• The Explanatory element; 
• The Amendatory element; and 
• The Culpability element. 
The first two elements stem from the accountability that each Minister owes to 
Parliament - they are under an obligation to explain all matters relating to their 
79 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 87. 
80 Matthew Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: Conflict 
or Complement'?" (Institute for International Research Conference on "Analysing and 
Understanding Crucial Developments in Public Law", Wellington, 4 April 2001). 
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portfolio areas, and to ensure that problems are rectified and failing processes 
amended. 81 According to the Cabinet Manual, Ministers are accountable to 
Parliament for ensuring that the departments for which they are responsible 
carry out their functions properly and efficiently. 82 The culpability aspect 
addresses the sanctions that may be imposed in cases of breach of responsibility, 
and has usually been described as requiring Ministers to resign for impropriety 
in relation to their Ministerial portfolios. 83 This is an uncertain test, and one 
which is undoubtedly more political than constitutional in nature. 
There has been an increase in the nwnber of public sanctions for breach 
of individual ministerial responsibility under MMP. No longer can a 
Government, secure in its position of power, sweep a miscreant Minister's 
actions under the carpet, or simply shuffle him or her into another portfolio. In 
1999, then National Prime Minister Jenny Shipley dismissed Tuariki Delamare 
from the immigration portfolio for inappropriate exercise of his individual 
Ministerial discretion. Delamere had approved permanent residency for a group 
of Chinese businessmen on the basis that they would invest in various Maori 
development schemes. However he remained a Minister within Cabinet with 
other responsibilities. 
Current Prime Minister Helen Clark is known to be tough on individual 
rninisters,84 with seven either resigning or being dismissed under her leadership. 
Dover Samuels was dismissed in June 2000 after facing allegations of sexual 
misconduct before he became a minister. He had previously refused to resign, 
but was finally forced to go because, as Clark said at the time, he could not be 
effective while sun-otmded by such controversial allegations. Ruth Dyson 
resigned from Cabinet in October 2000 after being stopped for drink-driving. 
Marian Hobbs and Phillida Bunkle both resigned from ministerial positions in 
February 2001 following investigations into their right to enrol on the 
Wellington Central electoral roll and to claim out-of-town living allowances 
8 1 Palmer, above n 80. 
82 Cabinet Office, above n 62, para 2.162. 
83 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1995) 140. 
8
~ Colin James "A Farm Girl, Discipline and Her Helicopter" (Management Magazine August 
2003) . 
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while living in Wellington. Ms Hobbs was reinstated once the investigation 
cleared her of wrongdoing. In February 2004, Lianne Dalziel resigned her 
portfolios amid allegations that she had misled the public over her involvement 
in the leaking of a legally privileged letter. John Tamihere stepped down in 
November 2004 following allegations of fraud. The latest resignation was that 
of David Benson-Pope, who stepped down in May 2005 after media reports that 
he was accused of bullying students during his time as a teacher before entering 
Parliament. Mr Benson-Pope denied the allegations. 
Simon Power has claimed that "in an MMP environment individual 
ministerial responsibility is a far more important convention ... because it is the 
only mechanism by which multi-parties have the opportunity to pin Ministers 
down to the departments they are responsible for. "85 However, the real use of 
individual responsibility under MMP has not been to sanction Ministers for 
transgressions or oversights in relation to their Ministerial portfolios. It has 
rather been to regulate behaviour of Ministers which might allow their integrity 
to be called into question, in either their public or private life. As Joseph has 
pointed out, "[a] Prime Minister will sacrifice a Minister whose personal failings 
cannot be publicly defended or are an ongoing liability to the Government."86 
Although Clark had known of the allegations against Samuels for several 
months, and the matter had been handed over to the Police, no action was taken 
against him until the matter became public knowledge. Ostensibly, Ruth 
Dyson ' s resignation was necessary because her transgression was related to her 
Ministerial duties for accident compensation and injury prevention. Although 
perhaps true in this case, it seems unlikely that the matter would have incurred 
no punishment had Dyson been responsible for another portfolio. The public 
reaction was such that a resignation would have been expected m any case, 
particularly as Dyson had, only the week previously, made very public 
statements about the need for public figures to act as good role models. 
87 
Almost as soon as accepting Dyson's resignation, however, Helen Clark 
indicated that it was likely that Dyson would eventually be reinstated as a 
85 (21 May 2003) 608 NZPD 5952. 
8
" Joseph, above n 7, 289. 
~
7 Ruth Dyson (26 October 2000) Press Release. 
36 
Cabinet Minister, 88 as indeed happened in June of the following year. In all 
seven cases the resignations or, in the case of Samuels, dismissal, came at a time 
when while the allegations of impropriety were just that - allegations. 
Do these examples show that the nature of individual ministerial 
responsibility is changing under MMP? Are Ministers being held accountable 
for transgressions which previously did not fall under the convention? Palmer 
suggests that the proper formulation of the culpable element of the doctrine of 
individual ministerial responsibility is that a Minister must resign when he or 
she loses the confidence of the Cabinet as expressed by the Prime Minister. 89 
Some Prime Ministers will take a stricter line with their Cabinets, as Clark 
seems to be doing. 9° Clark ' s willingness to reinstate Ministers once the public 
furore over their behaviour dies down supports the contention that the decision 
on whether to sanction individual ministers over misdemeanours unrelated to 
their ministerial portfolios is an essentially political one, which reflects the 
Government ' s need to retain an appearance of integrity in the public eye. Under 
MMP, there will be more political incentive on a Cabinet to cut its losses and 
dismiss an offending minister who has lost public confidence. 91 This is not 
necessarily a change in the convention, but a political approach to how the 
convention will apply. 
C Agreements of Supply and Support 
After the 2002 election, the Labour party had won 52 seats in the 120 
seat Parliament. It entered into a coalition agreement with the two-member 
Progressive Party, forming a minority coalition Governrnent. This meant that 
the coalition required the support of at least one other party on confidence and 
supply matters to allow it to govern. As it turned out, the Governrnent entered 
into agreements with both the United Future and Green Parties. 
88 "Dyson pays heavy price" OneNews <www.onenews.nzoom.com> (last accessed 18 July 
2005) . 
89 Palmer, above n 80. 
90 Palmer, above n 80. 
9 1 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, 89. 
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The United Future Parliamentary Caucus, by written agreement, 
undertook to provide confidence and supply to the Labour/Progressive 
Government for the current term of Parliament. 92 This agreement is intended to 
guarantee the durability of a stable Government, and operates on the basis of 
"good faith and no surprises" between the parties. In return for support in 
matters of confidence and supply, the coalition Government agreed to take 
United Future policy priorities into account in determining their policy agenda, 
and specifically undertook to not introduce certain legislative measures relating 
to the legal status of cannabis - interestingly, a policy of the other party most 
likely to provide support to the Government in individual legislative matters, the 
Greens. '>3 In addition, the Government will consult with United Future about the 
legislative programme, major policy issues and broad budget parameters. All 
exchanges of information in the course of consultation and negotiation will be 
kept confidential. 94 
One of the most interesting features of the Confidence and Supply 
agreement is its position on collective responsibility. The relevant provision 
reads: 95 
Although United Future will not be bound be collective responsibility on 
Government decisions, where there has been full participation in the development 
of a policy initiative, and that participation has led to an agreed position, it is 
expected that all parties to this agreement will publicly support the process and the 
outcome. 
The Co-operation Agreement between the Labour/Progressive 
Government and the Green Parliamentary Caucus commits the two parties to 
having a constructive relationship based on good faith, for the term of the 
current Parliament. The agreement sets out expectations of co-operation on 
agreed areas of policy development. A requirement of consultation is given 
paramount importance. Policy areas are allocated a category from A to C, with 
92 Agreement for Confidence and Supply, above n 32. 
93 See for example Misuse of Drugs (Cannabis Infringement) Amendment Bill, introduced by 
Green MP Nandor Tanczos. 
94 Agreement for Confidence and Supply above n 32, 2. 
95 Agreement for Confidence and Supply, above n 32, 2. 
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Category A indicating areas in which full co-operation in working towards joint 
policy positions is envisaged; Category B matters requiring consultation with a 
view to achieving support for legislative proposals; and Category C matters 
involving sharing of information with no particular expectation of developing 
shared positions. 96 As with United Future, there is an emphasis on 
confidentiality during any consultation or negotiation period. Both parties to the 
agreement are expected to publicly support any policies developed collectively 
about Category A matters.97 
These prov1s1ons suggest that at least the unanimity principle of 
collective responsibility is being extended to apply to the Government's support 
partners, in agreed upon situations. This fits with the rationale behind the 
principle, of promoting coherency of Government policy and confidence in the 
Government's ability to command the support of the House. It is of course 
important to remember that a support or co-operation agreement is a purely 
political agreement, and cannot be said to ove1Tide existing constitutional 
principles. However, if the practice of entering into such agreements of supply 
and support with smaller parties who are not part of a coalition Government 
becomes the nom1, it may have interesting implications for the development of 
expectations of behaviour within that relationship. 
VI DEMOCRACY AND MMP 
A voting system in a liberal democracy determines how elected legislators are 
chosen. Where Parliament is sovereign these elected legislators have the final 
say on contentious social policy issues as well as providing the pool from which 
members of the executive such as the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance 
are chosen. So the voting system matters; how elected legislators are chosen is a 
basic feature of any democracy, including New Zealand's.
98 
% Co-operation Agreement, above n 69, 1. 
97 Co-operation Agreement, above n 69, 2. 
98 James Allen "Changing the Voting System or Creating a Brand New Highest Court - Is One 
More Constitutionally Fundamental than the Other in a Liberal Democracy?" (2005) 11 Otago 
LR17,23. 
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The changing demograprucs of New Zealand's population have 
demanded recognition that New Zealand is a multicultural society. If 
democracy is to be one our nation's underlying principles, and New Zealanders 
pride themselves that it is, 99 there is a need to reflect this change in the electoral 
system. This in itself may be seen as a constitutional change - if New Zealand 
really is a democratic nation then the way in which this is put into practice must 
be also be a constitutional principle. A state cannot trnly claim to be democratic 
if its electoral system does not function in a democratic manner.
100 As the above 
quote indicates, a Parliamentary election determines not only the membership of 
the legislative, but also who may form an executive Government. One of the 
primary concerns under FPP was that the number of seats in the House was 
usually distributed among the two largest political parties, to the detriment of 
smaller parties. Voters who chose to support a smaller party felt that their votes 
were wasted, as their candidate rarely had a chance of winning an electoral seat 
when competing against the larger parties, and there was no other way of 
gaining a place in the House. The need to ensure that the House of 
Representatives would truly reflect the choices of the voting public was one of 
the prime concerns of the Royal Commission in 1986. In summarising the 
characteristics of the FPP voting system, the Commission came to the following 
conclusions: 101 
2.56 The foregoing survey of plurality against our criteria shows that 
New Zealand's voting system has serious deficiencies . Even in those areas where 
plurality has recognised strengths, there are real qualifications to be made. Thus, 
plurality rates well in terms of effective representation of constituents, but does not 
cater for many of those who wish to approach an MP of their own party. Voter 
participation is enhanced by the ease with which valid votes may be cast, but the 
votes of many electors are ineffective in influencing the overall result. Plurality is 
generally conducive to effective Government and enables implementation of 
policies in a decisive way, but this may not necessarily result in stable and 
effective Government in the long term. Plurality does produce an effective 
'J
9 As does the Rt Hon Sir Kenneth Keith: "On the Constitution of New Zealand: An Introduction 
To The Foundations Of The Current Form Of Government" (2001) in Cabinet Office, above 62, 
l. 
100 See Alan McRobie "Elections and the Electoral System" in Raymond Miller (Ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (2ed, Oxford University Press, Auck.land, 2001) 185, 185. 
101 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 1, 28. 
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Parliament, but provides little to check a powerful executive. It assists the 
development of effective parties, but the broad-based appeal required of candidates 
limits the ability of parties to select candidates who are representative of a range of 
groups and interests. The legitimacy of the system is well accepted, though this 
may in significant measure be due to the impartiality with which it is administered 
and a lack of knowledge about alternative systems. 
2.57 In those areas where plurality is acknowledged to have weaknesses, 
these are severe indeed. Not only is plurality unfair to supporters of major parties, 
but it is also grossly unfair to supporters of minor parties . Plurality also fails to 
ensure reasonable recognition and representation for significant minority and 
other special interest groups. In particular, and despite the 4 Maori seats, plurality 
denies effective Maori representation. 
MMP was not the only system considered as an option - others were also 
canvassed, but the characteristics of MMP were seen as offering the most 
advantages (or least disadvantages) when lined up against the principles that the 
Commission thought should underpin the voting system. 102 MMP allows the 
composition of the House to more closely reflect the wishes of the voting public, 
by allowing voters to choose both an individual candidate to represent their local 
concerns, and a party whose policies they would like to see play a role in the 
future policy direction of Government. 
A fmiher impact of the democratic nature of MMP is that it makes 
Governments more directly answerable to public opinion on policy issues. Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer has pointed out that a single-party Government with a secure 
majority, as was the no1m under FPP, could sustain unpopular policies for 
longer than is now the case when there is a minority Government under MMP. 
Any smaller parties supporting the Government will be acutely aware of the 
impact on their own popularity and standing in the polls, should they appear to 
be supporting Government policies which do not enjoy a public mandate. "[If 
the Government] gets too unpopular in too many areas it will not be able to 
102 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n I , 63-64. 
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secure the numbers for passing its budget or passing its legislation and so it has 
to pay attention to the public preferences." 103 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
"[W]e don't really know in New Zealand what our Constitution is with any great degree 
of precision .. . it's a human construct, an idea about governance. I suppose the thing you 
want most from it is good Government. You want the rules of Government to be 
effective so that the governance of the country is optimal.',1°4 
MMP has not in fact changed the constitutional strnctures, or functions 
of Government. What is has changed is the potential for how the constitutional 
structures will operate in the political reality. The real impact of MMP depends 
primarily on the outcome of each election - how much support is enjoyed by the 
governing party? If one party were to gamer more than 50 per cent of the 
popular vote, the operation of Government would be hardly distinguishable from 
that under FPP. The effectiveness of MMP in acting as a check on the power of 
the executive arm depends on its representative nah1re, and the probability that a 
multi-cultural and multi-valued society will return a diversity of political parties 
to power. 
Under a minority Government, the potential for MMP to rein back the 
power of the executive is more pronounced. In such a situation more power is 
given to other parties in Parliament to detennine, firstly, who will be given the 
authority to govern, and secondly, what policies will be enacted and in what 
form. The power that is devolved upon smaller parties should not however be 
overstated: as politicians become more familiar with the workings of MMP it is 
unlikely that a party which enjoys a large amount of public support will allow 
their policies to be directed to too great an extent by small parties. If small 
parties do appear to the public to be over-exercising the power that was granted 
103 Interview with Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer (Linda Clark, Nine-to-Noon, National Radio, Dec 
22, 2004) Chen.Palmer Archive - Transcripts 2004 <www.chenpalmer.co.nz> (last accessed 20 
July 2005). 
10
~ Interview with Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer (Maggie Barry, Nine-to-Noon, National Radio, 
25 May 2005) ChenPalmer Archive - Transcripts 2005 <www.chenpalmer.co.nz> (last accessed 
26 July 2005). 
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to them at the ballot box, no doubt they will feel the political consequences at 
the next election (as did happen with New Zealand First in 1999, when they won 
only 4.26 per cent of the vote105). Under the present Government, it appears that 
support parties are willing to guarantee support to the Government in return for 
an integration of one or two of their key electoral platforms into the 
Governmental agenda - for example, United Future's commitment to the 
establishment of a Commission on the Family, and the Green's commitment to 
facilitating a review of the Environmental Risk Management Authority. 
The effect of MMP on the legislative process has been to make it easier 
for the legislative branch to determine the content of particular policy proposals, 
and to delay or veto others. Palmer and Palmer suggest that New Zealand is 
now close to approaching a situation analogous to that in the United States -
when it comes to matters of unpopular legislation, the Government proposes and 
the Legislature disposes. 106 Which may perhaps not be an entirely bad thing - it 
enhances the separation of powers, and ensures that the power to legislate 
remains in the right hands. However, it may be detrimental to efficient 
government - indeed, the choice for MMP over FPP was a compromise between 
the ideals of representation and efficiency. It is important to ensure that the 
many advantages of MMP are not overshadowed by the perception that 
necessary measures are being delayed because they do not attract sufficient 
attention to withstand the rigours of the political testing now common in an 
MMP environment. 
The method of Government forn1ation allows the legislative to exercise 
control over the composition of the executive, effectively determining its 
legitimacy. The strength of a Government is now detern1ined by the degree of 
support it can muster in the House of Representatives. The legislature now has a 
greatly increased ability to determine the composition of Government. The 
potential for a legislative to withdraw its support of Government also acts as an 
important check on executive action. 
105 As leader Winston Peters won an electorate seat, the 5 per cent threshold was waived and 
New Zealand First was allocated five seats in the House. 
100 Palmer and Palmer, above n 14, 371. 
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Norman St John Stevens once said that "procedure is the best 
constitution that we have." 107 Conventions such as collective Cabinet 
responsibility and individual Ministerial responsibility are essential to ensure the 
continuation of a democratic and accountable Government. These procedural 
safeguards do more than illustrate the principles of the constitution, they shape 
the way in which the constitution translates principle into practice. Under MMP, 
these conventions have been forced to adapt to meet the new needs of working 
under a coalition or a minority Government. The convention of collective 
responsibility now recognises that coalition partners may have different 
interests - the core of the convention remains, to maintain the principle of 
efficient, united Government, but in an altered manner, to allow for the principle 
of party autonomy (and in recognition of political reality). The convention of 
individual Ministerial responsibility has also adapted to reflect the increased 
pressures on Ministers to be accountable for their actions to the House. 
Under FPP, the balance of power between the executive and legislative 
branches of Government was tipped disproportionately towards the former. The 
main overriding effect of MMP on the New Zealand Constitution, therefore, has 
been to curtail the power of executive, by providing more scope for the 
legislature to act as a check on its decisions and behaviour. 
107 Norman St John Stevens, former English MP, cited in Diane Morcom, Secretary of Cabinet 
''Quills, Qubits and the Quest for Quality" (IPANZ Seminar, Wellington, 25 April 2005). 
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